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PEOPLE v. McKINNON-A NEW MOVE
IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires, upon

a showing of probable cause, the issuance of a warrant prior to search
or seizure.- Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that exceptional situations militate against securing a warrant prior to a
search.' For example, there may be a likelihood that evidence will

be destroyed or an officer placed in danger if a search is not conducted
immediately.' In defining certain narrow exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the Court has recognized that in extraordinary circumstances individual privacy may be sacrificed in order to meet the needs

of law enforcement.
The California Supreme Court in the recent case of People v. McKinnon4 has broadened an exception to the warrant requirement. In
that case, the court held that if law enforcement officials have probable
cause, they may conduct a warrantless search and seizure of goods
consigned to a common carrier for shipment. 5 In so holding the California court relied on the well-developed rule that automobiles may be
the proper subject of warrantless searches and seizures because they
are fleeting targets. 6
This note adopts the position that the holding of the California
court is not sound and that the analogy to the automobile exception
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
2. See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
3. "ilt is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
4. 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
5. Id. at 902-03, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
6. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See text accompanying
notes 47-54 infra.
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ignores the fundamental basis of the United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with this exception. The court fails to address the
crucial question of whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. By failing to confront this question directly, the court
arrives at a holding that is inconsistent with the controlling cases and
puts forth a rule that cannot withstand analysis. Finally, it will be argued that the holding is undesirable, because it significantly erodes
the requirements for obtaining a search warrant with a consequent loss
of individual privacy.

Factual Setting of McKinnon
On March 10, 1969, Lloyd George McKinnon and John Scott Turk
brought five cardboard cartons to the United Airlines freight counter at
the San Diego airport. The cartons were described as containing "personal effects" and were consigned for shipment to Seattle. The airline
agent, suspecting the cartons contained contraband, obtained permission from his supervisor to inspect one of the cartons.7 Discovering
what he believed were packages of marijuana,8 the agent notified the police. An officer from the State Bureau of Narcotics arrived
some twenty or thirty minutes later and conducted a search verifying
that the contents of the packages were marijuana. The defendants
7. 7 Cal. 3d at 903, 500 P.2d at 1100, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
8. The defense argued that the airline agent was acting as an agent of the
police when he opened the footlockers and therefore the search should be subject to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. A witness for the defense testified that
she had interviewed the airline agent a few days before the hearing and had been told
by the agent that the police had asked him and his fellow agents to be alert for suspicious persons or packages. If their suspicions were aroused they were allegedly told
to open the box and if contraband were found they were to leave the box open and
call the police. Id. at 905, 500 P.2d at 1101, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 901. The court held
that whether an individual is acting as an agent of the police is ordinarily a question of
fact and in this case "the evidence fully supports the magistrate's finding of fact that
Gos was acting as a private individual when he opened the package here in issue.
For the reasons stated, therefore, it was not necessary that in so doing he have probable cause to believe it contained contraband."
Id. at 916, 500 P.2d at 1109, 103
Cal. Rptr. at 909.
The Fourth Amendment applies to the states, and evidence acquired in violation
of its mandates is inadmissible in state courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
But the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches conducted by private individuals.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
The subject of when a private individual loses his private status and takes on the
status of an agent of the police is outside the scope of this note. For an example of a
situation holding private individuals to be acting in concert with the police and thereby
rendering the seized evidence inadmissible, see Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d
97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968). For a discussion of the agency problem
in the specific context of airport searches see Note, Airport Security Searches and
the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1971).
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were apprehended shortly thereafter9 and were subsequently charged
with transporting marijuana' ° and possession of marijuana for sale."
The defendants both filed motions to suppress the evidence on
the ground that it was the product of an illegal search and seizure.' 2
The court at the preliminary hearing dismissed the charges as to McKinnon and set aside the information as to Turk.' 3 The appellate court
affirmed. The California Supreme Court, in a four to three decision,
reversed and held the evidence admissible.
In this typical air freight search case we are called upon to
reconsider People v. McGrew... and Abt v. Superior Court...
in the light of supervening developments in the law. As will appear, we conclude that the rule of those decisions is no longer to
be followed, and that a chattel consigned to a common carrier
for shipment may lawfully be searched upon probable cause to believe it contains contraband.' 4
People v. McGrew' and Abt v. Superior Court 6 were cases remarkably similar on their facts to the situation before the court in McKinnon. Both cases involved packages containing marijuana which were
were consigned for shipment at an airport,' 7 and in both cases officers
conducted a search without obtaining a warrant.' 8 But in those two
cases the searches were declared invalid. The court based its decisions
on a finding that it was not impractical for the police to secure a
warrant prior to the search.' 9 The McKinnon court therefore found
it necessary to directly overrule McGrew and Abt.2 0
The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement
In order to investigate the soundness of the court's holding in
9. 7 Cal. 3d at 903-04, 500 P.2d at 1100, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
10. Id. at 903, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899. CAL. HEALTH & S.
CODE § 11531 (West 1964).
11. 7 Cal. 3d at 903, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899. CAL. HEALTH &
S. CODE § 11530.5 (West 1964).
12. 7 Cal. 3d at 903, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 902-03, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
15. 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
16. 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P.2d 10, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969).
17. People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 406-07, 462 P.2d 1, 2, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473,
474 (1969); Abt v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 420, 462 P.2d 10, 11, 82 Cal. Rptr.
481, 482 (1969).
18. People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 408, 462 P.2d 1, 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473,
476 (1969); Abt v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 420, 462 P.2d 10, 11, 82 Cal. Rptr.
481, 483 (1969).
19. People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 409-10, 462 P.2d 1, 4-5, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473,
476-77 (1969); Abt v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 421, 462 P.2d 10, 11-12,
82 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (1969).
20. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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McKinnon, it is necessary to discuss the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. Interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, have been
confusing. 21 It is well established that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect citizens against unreasonable intrusions by
government officials. 22 In order to effectuate this policy the Supreme
Court has developed a per se rule of reasonableness which requires
that a warrant be obtained unless the facts fit into one of a few exceptions.2
For a number of years there has been a conflict between those
who thought that a warrantless search would be proper if by looking
at all the facts it could be deemed reasonable, and those who thought
that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for a search to be reasonable. The Court's decisions have swung back and forth between
these two positions. United States v. Rabinowitz2' was the leading
case for the reasonableness of the search approach.
The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion
in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case. It is a sufficient precaution that law officers must justify their conduct before courts which have always
been, and must be, jealous of the individual's 2 5right of privacy
within the broad sweep of the Fourth Amendment.
In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter eloquently defended
the per se requirement.
One cannot wrench "unreasonable searches" from the text and
context and historic content of the Fourth Amendment. It was
the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches
without warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope.
Both were deemed "unreasonable." Words must be read with
the gloss of the experience of those who framed them. Because the experience of the framers of the Bill of Rights was so
vivid, they assumed that it would be carried down the stream of
history and that their words would receive the significance of the
experience to which they were addressed-a significance not to
be found in the dictionary. When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on to define the very
21. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971), Mr. Justice
Stewart noted the difficulties existing in the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
"Of course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth
Amendment law to complete order and harmony. The decisions of the Court over
the years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will
make them all perfectly consistent."
22. E.g., Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
23. E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S, 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
24. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
25. Id. at 66.
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restricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss
of history that a search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant authorizes
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute neces26
sity.

Rabinowitz overruled Trupiano v. United States 7 which had
stated the per se requirement.2 8 However, Chimel v. California9
overruled Rabinowitz and reinstated the strict warrant requirement."0
A recent and direct statement of the warrant requirement can be found
in Katz v. United States.3 1 "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 2
Even though Rabinowitz has been overruled and the per se warrant requirement established as good law today, the philosophical argument still continues. 33 The strict per se requirement can be difficult for the courts to apply in cases where probable cause is obvious,
where the search was conducted in a restrained manner, and where
it appears that going to a magistrate is an extreme formality. The
immediate effect of applying the rule in such a situation is suppression
of incriminating evidence and quite possibly loss of a conviction. To
the extent that the police cannot carry out immediate warrantless
searches there is a feeling that some evidence will be lost and criminals will evade punishment. No doubt some courts have trouble
applying the rule when such results occur.3 4
26. Id. at 70.
27. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
28. "It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable." Id.
at 705.
29. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
30. Id. at 767-68. Chinel did not reinstate the Trupiano holding. Trupiano
disallowed seizure of objects in plain sight, incident to a valid arrest, when the law
enforcement officials knew for some time in advance that the search was to be conducted. 334 U.S. 699, 704-08 (1948).
No decision since Trupiano has gone quite so far in disallowing seizure of objects
in plain view. The latest decision on the point is Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971). There, the Court held that evidence resulting from a seizure of objects in plain view during a valid arrest is admissible even if the officers had time to
obtain a warrant, as long as the discovery was "inadvertent." Id. at 469-71, 482. But
Chinel did reaffirm the general principle that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless there are exigent circumstances. 395 U.S. 752, 767-68.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

32. Id. at 357.
33. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Stewart's extended analysis of the present differences in
philosophy concerning warrantless searches and seizures in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-83 (1971).
34. Of course there are some who believe we pay too large a price for the ex-
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The reason for the per se requirement is the belief that a neutral
magistrate should determine the existence of probable cause. A fervent desire to root out criminal activity must be encouraged, but it must
also be controlled to protect the privacy of the citizenry. Proponents
of a strict showing of necessity to dispense with the warrant requirement believe that the deliberate and impartial judgment of a magistrate should be interposed between the citizen and a police search. It
is thought that a neutral and detached magistrate can bring a degree
of objectivity to a situation which, in times of stress, may be difficult
to expect of law enforcement officials."
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. 36
A citizen has a right to expect that, absent an emergency, the impartial judgment of a magistrate will be interposed between him and a police search.
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The courts have recognized that in certain instances a search may
be reasonable without a warrant, given an emergency or exigent circumstances.3 7 Fortunately, the exceptions to the warrant requirement
have been well defined and rarely expanded. Three well recognized
exceptions have developed. First, a search may be conducted without a warrant if it is incident to a valid arrest;38 second, an object
may be seized when in plain view;3 9 finally, a warrantless search of an
automobile is valid if there is some probability that it will be removed
from the area.40 These exceptions were all developed on the theory
that to require a warrant in these circumstances would create a great
likelihood that evidence or contraband would be destroyed or removed
clusionary rule and would like to do away with it entirely. See Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, where he proposes an alternative
to the exclusionary rule. 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971).
35. E.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464 (1932).
36. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
37. See cases cited in text accompanying notes 38-40 infra.
38. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Chimel v. United States, 395
U.S. 752 (1969).
39. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
40. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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from1 the jurisdiction, or would create a danger to police or bystand4
ers.
Illustrative of the Court's reluctance to infringe upon the citizen's
fundamental rights by liberally construing these exceptions is Chimel
v. California42 where the Court held that the scope of a search incident
to a lawful arrest includes only the person of the arrestee and the area
under his immediate control. 43 The solid reasoning behind this decision is that the officer needs to secure his own safety by checking
the arrestee for weapons and to prevent any evidence or contraband
from being destroyed. Thus the exigent circumstances allow the officers to search only in a limited area.
The theory of the Chimel decision is sound. It is based upon the
proposition that if a reasonable search requires the interposition of a
judge's determination of probable cause, then any exception to this
purposeful requirement must be limited solely to the need for the exception. Thus the exigencies strictly determine the scope of the warrantless search.44 For if the per se warrant requirement is indeed desirable, then the exceptions to it must be strictly circumscribed by
need.
Just as the scope of a search incident to an arrest is narrowly limited, so is the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. This
exception has been limited to the exact circumstances the name indicates, objects in plain view of an officer who is where he has a right to
be. For instance, objects in a closed container are not considered in
plain view even though the container is in plain view.4 5 In fact the
that the situation described by this
California Supreme Court has said
4
exception is really no search at all. 1
The exception that is particularly relevant to this note has come
to be known as the "automobile" exception. The development and
extent of this exception is crucial to the decision in McKinnon.
The automobile exception was first recognized in Carroll v.
United States.47 Believing that Mr. Carroll's car contained illegal liquor, a federal agent, acting upon probable cause, stopped the car on
the highway and searched it without securing a warrant. He found
41. See note 3 supra.
42. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Accord, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
43. 395 U.S. at 763.
44. "The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
(1968) (Fortas, J., concurring), citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
45. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 58-59, 442 P.2d 665, 669, 69 Cal. Rptr.
585, 589 (1968).
46. Id. at 56, 442 P.2d at 668, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
47. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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illegal liquor, and Mr. Carroll was arrested and convicted. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search on the theory that by the
time the warrant procedures were complied with, an automobile
mov48
ing on the highway would be removed from the jurisdiction.
The Court took great care in developing the historical basis for
this exception to the warrant requirement, showing that from the early
formation of the government, statutes have differentiated vehicles
such as boats, cars, sleds, and wagons from buildings or homes that
are stationary.
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes
to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought. 49
This exception, based upon mobility, was followed in three
cases involving automobiles and illegal liquor.50 It must be emphasized that these cases all involved automobiles stopped in the course of
transportation where there was danger that the suspected contraband
would be removed from the jurisdiction.
In Preston v. United States5 the Court held to the reasoning behind the automobile exception. Three men seated in a car were arrested for vagrancy, and the car was taken to a police garage where it
was later searched. The search was held to be too remote from the
arrest to be valid as a search incident to an arrest.52 The Court also
stated that the Carroll exception could not be applied as the men and
the car were in police custody, and hence there was no danger that the
car would be moved out of the jurisdiction. 53 Again, the idea of mobility determining exigency was emphasized. 54
48. Id. at 151, 153.
49. Id. at 153.
50. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
51. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
52. Id. at 367-68.
53. "Inhere was no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any
weapons in the car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime ....
Nor ...
was there any danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction."
Id. at 368.
54. Another auto case often mentioned in the development of this exception is
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). However, this case is not in point as the
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People v. McGrew
As previously mentioned the fact situations in McGrew and McKinnon were remarkably similar. The reasoning of the majority in
People v. McGrew5" was a sound interpretation of Fourth Amendment
principles. The California Supreme Court followed the strict per se
warrant requirement and held that absent an emergency a warrant
must be obtained.56 The significance of the majority position was that
it found no "fleeting circumstances" sufficient to justify a warrantless
search by the police.5 7 The court held that there was no likelihood
destroyed as the
that the lockers would be removed or the contraband
58
lockers were safely in the custody of the airlines.
It is important to note that the court in McGrew was making essentially a factual determination that there was no likelihood of the
suspected contraband being removed from the reach of a search warrant. This decision, which appears to be sound, must be refuted by
the McKinnon court if the majority is to later decide that there was
an emergency sufficient to justify a warrantless search.59
Chambers v. Maroney
The majority opinion in McKinnon relied upon Chambers v.
Maroney ° to such an extent that the court did not find it necessary to
refute the finding in People v. McGrew. Instead, McGrew was held
not to be viable law in light of Chambers.6
In Chambers two men were stopped on the highway in their automobile. The police had probable cause to believe the men had
robbed a service station a short time previously. The car was not
searched at the time of arrest, but because of the time of night and
the poor street lighting the car was towed to the police station where
it was searched a few hours thereafter.
Writing for a majority of the Court, Mr. Justice White first considered whether the car could initially have been searched at the time
of arrest without a warrant. He found that such a search would have
Court used the reasonableness of the search standard in allowing a warrantless search.
Id. at 62.
55.
56.
57.
58.

1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
Id. at 409, 462 P.2d at 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
Id. at 410, 462 P.2d at 5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
Id.

59. The dissenters in McGrew, who become the majority in McKinnon, did not
rely on the "automobile" exception in their dissent. Instead, they argued that McGrew
consented to the search because of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
that he contractually accepted the right of the airlines to search. Id. at 414-17, 462
P.2d at 8-10, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 479-81.
60. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
61. 7 Cal. 3d at 910, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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been justified by the exigencies of the situation as the automobile was a
fleeting target for a search. 6 2 Turning to the subsequent search at the
station house, the Court said:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment,
only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a
search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion
is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But
which is the "greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion is itself a
debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of
circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference
between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on 6 3the other
hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.
The Court reasoned that exigent circumstances forced the police to
choose between one of two alternatives: either the car had to be seized
until a warrant could be obtained or an immediate search could be
conducted without a warrant. Since neither course of action creates
a greater intrusion into the individual's right of privacy, either alternative was viewed as reasonable. 64
The trouble with this line of reasoning is that the car had already
been seized and towed to the police station. At this point in time,
the initial dilemma facing the police was no longer present. But Justice
White reasoned that the mobility of the car still obtained at the station house, because the car must continue to be kept immobilized. 6
The Court thus put forth a doctrine of constructive mobility into the
law of warrantless searches of movable vehicles.
This doctrine only narrowly expanded the police power to make a
warrantless search. Chambers still demanded that there be exigent
circumstances for the police to make an initial intrusion into a citizen's
privacy. 66 Chambers did say that if the police must seize the car
and deny access to it to all persons, then they have the right to search
67
it without securing a warrant.
Viewing the car as mobile at the station house is of course pure
fiction. The vehicle can only be considered to be mobile in a very lim62. 399 U.S. at 51.
63. Id. at 51-52.
64. In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan seriously questioned the soundness of the
majority's reasoning, "[P]ersons who wish to avoid a search ... will almost certainly
prefer a brief loss of the use of the vehicle in exchange for the opportunity to have a
magistrate pass upon the justification for the search." He went on to point out that
such a person can always consent to an immediate search if he will be more deeply
offended by a temporary immobilization of his vehicle. Id. at 64.
65. "The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the
mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the
car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured." Id. at 52.
66. Id. at 50-51.
67. Id. at 52.
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ited sense in that the police must continue to detain the automobile, re-

fusing possession to anyone until a warrant is obtained. But in reality the car is in effective police custody and has been rendered as
immovable as any object can be that is not actually nailed down.
Such a fiction makes the Chambers holding difficult to reconcile with
other automobile exception cases.6 8
Chambers demanded that there be exigent circumstances for the

police to make the initial intrusion. It was only after this initial determination that the case slips from the strict per se requirement to the
Rabinowitz reasonable test.6 9 If the per se warrant requirement is to
be followed, it should not be brushed aside on the rationale that since

the police have already made such a large, justified intrusion into privacy, a little more of an intrusion should not require a warrant.
While it can be argued that Chambers does not logically follow
in the development of the automobile exception, the decision represents only a narrow expansion of the automobile exception. The
Court did not purport to do away with the requirement of exigent circumstances in the context of a warrantless search of a movable vehicle. Chambers may be cited for the proposition that given exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless search of a movable vehicle, it
is not unreasonable for the car to be searched a short while later at
the police station without obtaining a warrant. However, it must be
emphasized that the requirements of the Carroll exception have not
been changed for an initialintrusion.
Exigent Circumstances
In order to overrule McGrew the majority in McKinnon first
considered whether footlockers consigned to a common carrier for shipment could be equated with automobiles as proper subjects for
warrantless searches and seizures. It was recognized that unlike an
automobile, a box or trunk does not possess its own motive power, but
the distinction was found to be insignificant:
[A] box [consigned for shipment with a common carrier] has
neither wheels nor motive power; but these features of an automobile are legally relevant only insofar as they make it movable
despite its dimensions. A box . .. is movable without such appurtenances. It is also true that a box or trunk, as distinguished
from an autmobile, may serve the double purpose of both storing
goods and packaging them for shipment. But whenever such a box
is consigned to a common carrier,
there can be no doubt that it is
70
intended, in fact, to be moved.
68. Compare Chambers with the other cases cited in note 72 infra.
69. For a discussion of the Rabinowitz reasonableness test see text accompanying
notes 24-33 supra.
70. 7 Cal. 3d at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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Since the footlockers were found to possess the requisite mobility,
which the majority felt was the distinguishing characteristic of automobiles, that explained their special treatment under the Fourth Amendment, and it logically followed that "the reasons for the rule perprobable cause are
mitting a warrantless search of a vehicle upon
71
equally applicable to the search of such a chattel."
The analogy of the court may well be questioned. Is a chattel
consigned to a common carrier for shipment movable? It must be remembered that in the development of the Carroll exception the word
"movable" connotes "fleeting circumstances". 72 Surely the circumstances are not fleeting simply because, as the court points out, the
owner intends that something be moved. The footlockers could have
been considered fleeting only if they had been placed in a vehicle and
were about to be shipped from the jurisdiction; 73 but this was not the
fact situation in McKinnon. In McKinnon the footlockers had merely
been placed in the custody of the airline.
The automobile exception is based on the concept of "mobility"
-fleeting
circumstances-determining exigency. A vehicle in the
course of transport may be searched or seized because it is a fleeting
target. This is not true of sealed containers consigned for shipment
with a common carrier. Such objects are not fleeting until placed in
a movable vehicle. The court's reasoning is particularly weak when
the object is in the custody of individuals who are anxious to see it
delivered into police custody.
It might be proper for the California court to extend the Carroll
71. Id.
72. All of the Supreme Court decisions following Carroll in which the exception
has been held to apply have involved automobiles. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v.
United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
At least two lower federal court cases have extended the Chambers rationale to
suitcases being carried by defendant at the time of his arrest when the search of the
suitcase was made after the arrest was effected. United States v. Maynard, 439 F.2d
1086 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 974 (1971). But see United States v. Colbert, 454 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1972)
(two to one decision); where on similar facts the court held the above two cases were
no longer consistent with the "Carroll principle and its underlying rationale" in light of
the decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Id. at 804. For a
discussion of the holding in Coolidge see text accompanying notes 84-105 inIra.
73. Mr. Justice Peters, in a vigorous dissent, answered the majority's argument
this way: "The rule of Carroll, and its progeny is clear. Where the goods are in the
course of transportation, i.e., in a vehicle capable of conveying them beyond the jurisdiction, a search without a warrant may be conducted. . . [upon] probable cause . ..
A carton in a freight office is not a vehicle. It may be used to store goods or to
package them for shipment; a carton cannot get from here to there on its own power."
7 Cal. 3d at 922, 500 P.2d at 1113, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
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exception to movables about to be placed in a vehicle and sent from
the jurisdiction. This would simply extend the Carroll exception one
step further to include property about to be placed in the course of
transportation. Although this may not be a proper extension of Carroll, it would at least be an attempt to be consistent with the theory of
Carroll.

It is also disturbing to note that the court gives as one reason for
allowing this warrantless search that the consignee may come to reclaim his goods.74 The court here seems to be relying on the fact
that a footlocker is inherently movable. Such reasoning would allow
all chattels not within the immediate control of the owner to be
searched by the police without any showing of exigent circumstances
other than the simple fact that the chattels may be moved. Surely the
court cannot be advocating such a position since it would abrogate
much of the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
The Misapplication of Chambers
The dissent in McGrew never argued that there were fleeting circumstances that justified police seizure of the contraband. 75 The McGrew dissenters argued a consent theory.1 6 As the majority in McKinnon, three of the same justices argued the Carroll exception, claiming that Chambers expanded the exception to include the fact situation of McGrew and McKinnon. This is perhaps the major mistake in
McKinnon. Chambers only dealt with an extension of police search
power after an initial, legal intrusion had been made. Chambers did
not modify in any way the need for fleeting circumstances to make
an initial seizure of the vehicle. 77 Thus, Chambers cannot have any
effect on police power to initially seize freight cargo consigned to a
common carrier. The court must rely on the Carroll exception to justify
the first intrusion.
Instead of making an independent determination that the footlockers could have been the object of a warrantless search, the Mc78
Kinnon court labeled the freight "mobile in the constitutional sense"
and concluded that the search was valid. The McKinnon majority did
not squarely confront the issue of whether there were exigent circumstances. The only instance in McKinnon where the majority confronted
this issue was when they stated: "[Aibsent these remedies, the chattel
will be shipped out of the jurisdiction or claimed by its owner or by
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
See note 59 supra.
1 Cal. 3d at 414-17, 462 P.2d at 8-10, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 479-81.
See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
7 Cal. 3d at 910, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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the consignee. ' 79 This is directly contrary to the finding of the McGrew court:
Nor was there any likelihood that the lockers would be removed or
the contraband destroyed; both footlockers were safely in the custody of the airlines. [T]he airlines were not even under a contractual obligation
80 to ship the footlockers before a warrant
could be obtained.
Instead of confronting this conflict, the McKinnon court says the
finding of the McGrew court is no longer legally relevant in light of
Chambers.8' The McKinnon court tries to analogize from Chambers to
McKinnon with the following language,
In Chambers the defendants' automobile was seized by police
officers and impounded at the police station; if the high court
can say, as it does, that under those circumstances "the mobility of
the car" still obtained at the station house [citation], a fortiori
chattel such as here involved remains "mobile" in the constitutional
sense82 despite its limited and voluntary bailment to a common cartier.
The mobility referred to in Chambers is the direct result of an
initial seizure resulting from exigent circumstances. The mobility results solely from the fact that once it was determined that the auto
could be seized without a warrant, the auto remained "mobile" until the police searched it. The mobility in Chambers refers to the status
of a car seized under exigent circumstances, but as yet not searched.
The mobility in McKinnon simply refers to physical mobility, and it is
therefore improper for the court to use the Chambers concept in the
absence of an initial determination of exigent circumstances.
A factual finding of exigency warranting a seizure or search of
the footlockers is therefore the crucial issue in McKinnon. If the footlockers were indeed a fleeting target for a search there would be no
reason to invoke the rationale of Chambers. Without such a finding,
Chambers is not applicable to the facts of McKinnon.
The actual holding of the case was, "that a chattel consigned to a
common carrier for shipment may lawfully be searched upon probable
cause to believe it contains contraband."8 3 This holding is so broad
and lays down such an inflexible rule that it poses a serious threat to
Fourth Amendment standards. It is also not responsive to the question posed throughout this note: Is the target of the search such a
fleeting object that there is no time to secure a search warrant from a
neutral and detached magistrate?
79. Id. at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
80. 1 Cal. 3d at 410, 462 P.2d at 5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
81. 7 Cal. 3d at 910, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
82. Id.
83. 7 Cal. 3d at 902-03, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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The holding allows the police acting on probable cause to make a
warrantless search of any cargo consigned to any type of common carrier. There is no qualification that there be exigent circumstances.
Evidently the court feels that anytime cargo is consigned to a common
carrier there is a reasonable likelihood of it being removed from the
possibility of police search before a warrant can be obtained. Unfortunately, there is no reasoning in the opinion to support this idea.
The court by laying down this wide, inflexible rule enlarges police search power beyond that permitted by the per se warrant requirement and the Carroll exception. The fact that the holding is a rule,
and not a standard, indicates that the court has indeed neglected to
consider the true concept of exigency. As a rule of law it does not
allow for the flexibility necessary to protect citizens when there would
be time to secure a warrant.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
The latest United States Supreme Court decision addressing the
automobile exception is Coolidge v. New Hampshire.8 4 Mr. Coolidge had been under suspicion of murder for several days. He was arrested in his home pursuant to warrants issued for his arrest and for a
search of the premises. The warrants were held to be invalid because
they were not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate; 5 hence,
the search and seizure consideration was based upon a warrantless
search. s8 At the time of his arrest, Coolidge's car was parked in his
driveway. It was seized and taken to the police station where it was
searched two days later and subsequently over a year later. Incriminating evidence was found in the car which was introduced into evi7
dence at trial and led to Coolidge's conviction.
Writing for a plurality of the court,"' Mr. Justice Stewart held that
the search could not be justified under the automobile exception. 9 In
84. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
85. The warrants were issued by the Attorney General acting in his capacity as
Justice of the Peace. He had been actively in charge of the investigation and was
chief prosecutor at the trial. Id. at 449-53.
86. Id. at 453.
87. The conviction was affirmed in State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d
547 (1969).
88. The opinion by Justice Stewart was joined in by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall. Justice Harlan concurred in Parts I, IID, and III of the opinion and the
judgment of the court. 403 U.S. at 491. Justices Black and White filed long dissents.
Id. at 493, 510. Justice Blackmum joined in most of Justice Black's dissent. Chief Justice Burger joined in Part I of the plurality opinion and filed a short dissent. He
also joined in Justice White's dissent and agreed with Parts II and I1 of Justice Black's
dissent. Id. at 492.
89. Id. at 478-80.
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Part IIB of his opinion 9" he narrowed those cases dealing with the automobile exception to a strict showing of exigent circumstances."
In
fact, Justice Stewart would have limited Chambers to its facts: "Chambers . . held only that, where the police may stop and search an au-

tomobile under Carroll, they may also seize and search it later at the
police station." ' 2 This part of the opinion however, was not joined in
by Mr. Justice Harlan who was the fifth member of the court constituting the plurality. The court in McKinnon correctly noted that this
3
part of the opinion was therefore without force as precedent.1
But in Part IID of the opinion, 94 which was joined in by Justice
Harlan and is therefore of precedential force, Justice Stewart emphasized that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. "If we were
to agree with Mr. Justice White that . . . seizures and searches of
automobiles are . . . per se reasonable given probable cause, then by

the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a
warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out
of the Constitution." 2
Whatever else Coolidge stands for,96 it is obvious that an automobile cannot be searched without a warrant merely because it is an
automobile. The capacity for mobility must be shown to be relevant to
the warrantless search. It is simply not enough to say that there is a
possibility that the vehicle may be moved.
This reasoning is very applicable to McKinnon since the plurality,
with Harlan concurring, emphasize that categories do not determine if
a warrantless search may be made, but rather exigent circumstances
do." Again, the issue is whether there were exigent circumstances.
The majority in McKinnon felt that if Coolidge did apply it could
90. Id. at 458-64.
91. Justice Stewart examined the automobile exception in detail in this part of his
opinion. He concluded that all of the cases rested on a strict showing of exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless search or seizure. "The word 'automobile' is not
a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.
inhere is nothing in this case to invoke . . . the rule of Carroll v. United States ....
[B]y no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be made into a case where 'it is
not practicable to secure a warrant'.... ".Id. at 461-62, quoting, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
92. 403 U.S. at 463.
93. 7 Cal. 3d at 911, 500 P.2d 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
94. 403 U.S. at 473-84.
95. Id. at 480.
96. Because of the similarity of the holdings in Part IB of the plurality opinion
which Justice Harlan did not join in, and Part III) which Justice Harlan did join in,
some writers have referred to Part IIB of the opinion as the holding of the case while
the language of Part IID should be considered controlling. E.g., The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HAuv. L. Rnv. 3, 247-48 (1971); 76 DiCm. L. REv. 333, 337 (1972).
97. See 403 U.S. at 479.
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be distinguished on its facts.9
Four reasons were given for this proposition. In McKinnon, the police knew for only a short time of the
existence or probable contents of the five cartons presented by respondents for shipment; second, the defendants were departing from the
premises and one was aboard an airplane preparing to fly out of the
jurisdiction; third, the cartons had been consigned to be delivered
to a remote jurisdiction; and, finally, there was probable cause to believe that the cartons contained not mere evidence, but contraband. 99
"Each of these factors was specifically found to be lacking in Coolidge;
measured by the high court's own standards, therefore, the opportunity to search in the case at bar was much more 'fleeting'--and prompt
action was far more imperative-than in Coolidge."'100
The McKinnon majority is saying that different facts in Coolidge dictate that the target of the search was not as fleeting as in McKinnon. However, this does not mean that it was not practical for the
police to secure a warrant in both instances. Again, the majority in
McKinnon does not address the issue of exigent circumstances and
explain why they think the cargo would be shipped out of the jurisdiction before the police could secure a warrant.
The first of the four differences listed above is the only one
that has any sound implication for McKinnon. The court distinguished
Coolidge on the basis that in Coolidge the officers knew about the car
and its role in the murder for some time prior to their seizure of it.
Thus there was sufficient time to obtain a warrant and, hence, the
Carroll exception would not apply. This would differentiate Coolidge from McKinnon if the court in McKinnon would also find that
there was not time to comply with the warrant procedures. Yet, the
court did not explicitly make this finding.
The court's observation that the defendants were departing from
the premises is not relevant. By the court's own account of the facts in
McKinnon, Officer McLaughlin searched the footlockers before he even
knew where the suspects were, or if they were leaving the premises. 1' 1
If this situation constituted an emergency justifying a warrantless
search, it was an exigency after the fact only.
The significance of the court's statement that the cartons were
consigned for shipment to a remote jurisdiction again begs the question whether there was time to comply with the warrant requirement.
There was no indication that the cartons were about to be shipped,
02
and the truth is that they were in the effective custody of the airline.1
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

7 Cal. 3d at 910, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
Id. at 911, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 903-04, 500 P.2d at 1100, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
In dissent, Justice Peters said on this point: "In McGrew the People con-
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The final reason given by the court for distinguishing Coolidge
is quite mysterious. Because the cartons contained contraband as opposed to "mere evidence" the court seems to be saying that a lesser
standard applies in order to justify a warrantless search. It is true
that Justice Stewart mentions such a distinction twice in the course of
his plurality opinion in Coolidge,1°3 but this was not the holding of the
case and in fact such a distinction was expressly rejected in Warden
v. Hayden,"°4 as the plurality specifically acknowledged.1" 5
Coolidge is relevant to McKinnon because it emphasizes that
categories do not determine the existence of exigent circumstances.
It also emphasizes the strict warrant requirement and the desirability
of preserving this requirement in order to protect Fourth Amendment
guarantees. Although Coolidge is easily distinguished from the McGrew-McKinnon fact situation, it does apply to show that there must
be a determination made whether it was reasonably possible to obtain a warrant before making an initial intrusion into Fourth Amendment guarantees. The police in Coolidge had ample time to secure a
warrant to search the car, thus their search was illegal. The McKinnon court must ask itself the same question and then detail why
footlockers are now a "fleeting target" when in McGrew they were not.
Conclusion
People v. McKinnon wrote an undesirable and unjustified expansion of police search power into California law. The court arrived at
this expansion by enlarging the automobile exception as developed in
Chambers v. Maroney. This note has demonstrated that the reliance
on Chambers as authority for McKinnon was unjustified as Chambers
expanded police search power in a very narrow manner, and only
after an initial intrusion had been justified by exigent circumstances.
In McKinnon the court never truly confronted the issue of exigent circumstances, but rather sought to bring the case within the Carroll exception by enlarging the category of automobiles to include freight
consigned to a common carrier. This category expansion ignored the
theory of the automobile exception and thus allowed the court to promulgate a rule broader than the exception allows. Also, the California
tended, as they do here, that footlockers are movable and therefore in imminent danger
of removal. This court said then that there was no danger of imminent removal or
destruction of the evidence in circumstances like those before us. The majority should
either reiterate today or forthrightly recant that statement because if it is true there
are no special circumstances to justify a search without a warrant and the search was
invalid." Id. at 918, 500 P.2d at 1110, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
103. 403 U.S. at 462, 472.
104. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
105. 403 U.S. at 464.
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court mistakenly distinguished Coolidge v. New Hampshirewhich reemphasized the strict warrant requirement and the requirement of exigent
circumstances.
The broad, inflexible holding of the court allows the police upon
probable cause to search any freight consigned to any common carrier
without any regard to whether there is time to secure a warrant before the freight is removed from the jurisdiction. Thus, the holding
stands in opposition to the principles of the strict warrant requirement
and the Carroll exception and as such should be regarded as unsound
law. The impartial determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate should be required whenever possible.
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